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THE CROSS NATIONAL MEMORIAL:  
AT THE INTERSECTION OF  
SPEECH AND RELIGION  
Mary Jean Dolan† 
INTRODUCTION 
As the expanding concept of government speech has increasingly 
succeeded as a defense to private speech claims under the Free 
Speech Clause, questions abound as to how this will affect the 
existing doctrinal maze of public religiously themed speech. This 
Symposium Article explores and reflects on these questions using two 
frames: Justice Souter’s final opinion on “government speech” and 
the underanalyzed 2002 National Memorial designation of the 
Mojave Cross war memorial.  
Among his parting words on this topic, Justice Souter observed: 
“The interaction between the ‘government speech doctrine’ and 
Establishment Clause principles has not . . . begun to be worked 
out . . . [and] it may not be easy to work out.”1 These words may 
sound puzzling to some. Establishment Clause claims, after all, 
frequently involve determining whether the speech should be 
attributed to a private speaker or the government.2 And so, whatever 
novelty exists, it derives from his use of the specific term 
                                                                                                                  
†  Assistant Professor, John Marshall Law School; BA, magna cum laude, University of 
Notre Dame; JD, cum laude, Northwestern University School of Law. Thanks to the editors of 
the Case Western Reserve Law Review for the invitation to participate in this Symposium on 
Government Speech and their hard work. Additional thanks to my co-panelists on the 
Establishment Clause & Government Speech panel, Douglas Laycock and Caroline Mala 
Corbin, and to panel moderator, Jessie Hill, for inspiration. I also appreciate the opportunity to 
present an early version of parts of this work at the First Annual Law & Religion Roundtable at 
Brooklyn Law School, June, 2010. Finally, thanks to Tom Keefe and Megan Price for help with 
the National Memorials research, and to Jeff Gaster for research assistance on this paper. 
1 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (emphasis added).  
2 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (“[T]here is a 
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment 
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses protect.” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)) (opinion of 
O’Conner, J.)).  
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“government speech doctrine,” which perhaps is better 
conceptualized as the “government speech defense.”  
Before their departure from the Court, both Justice Souter and 
Justice Stevens described this “recently minted” doctrine as 
consisting of a narrow canon of cases, including Rust v. Sullivan3 and 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,4 and now Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum,5 in which “government speech” was asserted to rebuff a 
Free Speech Clause claim.6 The general idea is that governments must 
“speak” in order to govern, and that doing so necessarily requires 
expressing the political viewpoint they were elected to promote.7 And 
so, even where private persons create or transmit the speech, their role 
does not trigger application of First Amendment speech protections—
or require government viewpoint neutrality.8  
The intersection of religion and speech is complicated by the fact 
that the two doctrines work in opposite directions. Turning again to 
Justice Souter’s observations in Summum, he explained it as follows: 
In Establishment Clause cases—where government is required to be 
neutral, and so seeks to avoid appearing to express a religious 
message—it typically increases the numbers of speech objects, for 
                                                                                                                  
3  500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding limiting federal funding to only those family planning 
clinics which agreed not to permit abortion counseling). 
4 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (denying a compelled speech claim, although the targeted tax in 
dispute paid for pro-beef ads that appeared to be sponsored by the industry).  
5 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (holding that the placement of a privately sponsored monument 
in a public park was government speech not subject to First Amendment scrutiny).  
6 See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“To date, our decisions relying on the recently 
minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my 
view, of doubtful merit.”); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government-
speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”). Justices Stevens and Souter 
also viewed the widely criticized public employee speech case, Garcetti v. Cebellos, 547 U.S. 
410 (2006), as involving the “government speech doctrine.” Johanns, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 
(Stevens, J., concurring); see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437–38. In an earlier article, I analyzed three 
lines of cases, sometimes all referred to as “government speech” decisions, and argued that 
Garcetti can be distinguished, though perhaps not defended, as involving somewhat different, 
managerial interests. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: The 
Establishment Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 14–34 (2010) 
[hereinafter Dolan, Government Identity Speech] (referring to the three cases listed in the text as 
“core” government speech). That Article also analyzed at length the subtle differences between 
the binary choice of speaker in “government speech” cases and the more graduated options used 
in Establishment Clause cases. 
7 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (“A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’” 
(quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000))). 
8 Id. The doctrine has been highly criticized by First Amendment scholars; and the facts 
of the first two cases were particularly inflammatory. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the 
First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing To Say?, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2010) (questioning the necessity of the new government speech doctrine); 
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 168, n.103 (1996) (collecting articles 
criticizing Rust); Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 321 n.26 (2007) (collecting articles criticizing Johanns).  
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the purpose of diluting any religious meaning9 (think of the crèche 
surrounded by snowmen and carolers upheld in Lynch).10 But, he 
explained, the more objects on display, the harder it then becomes to 
argue that each one conveys a governmental message. As a result, by 
taking steps to ward off an Establishment Clause violation, the 
government risks creating a private speech forum—which, in turn, 
means losing its “government speech” defense, and thus, being forced 
to include unwanted messages in its display or program.11 Under 
forum doctrine, where a government opens up previously nonpublic 
property, access or funds to private speakers, it is allowed to set 
reasonable content or speaker limitations, but the First Amendment 
requires it to remain viewpoint neutral in administering those 
categories.12 
The interaction between the changing speech and religion 
doctrines is currently framed by two recent, almost inverse, Supreme 
Court cases. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a Free Speech 
Clause case, the Court allowed the City to use the new “government 
speech” defense to reject a small religion’s “Seven Aphorisms” 
marker, while maintaining a donated Ten Commandments monument 
among its park’s permanent collection.13 While public attention and 
commentary focused on the unequal treatment of two religious 
symbols,14 the Establishment Clause was not at issue there. Instead, 
the Court analyzed whether, by accepting numerous private 
monument donations over the years, the City had created a 
“permanent monument forum” for private speech.15 The 9-0 decision 
held that monuments displayed in public parks are government 
speech, so that the government may express its own viewpoint 
through such displays.16  
The second, Salazar v. Buono,17 was an Establishment Clause 
case. There, a majority of the Court seemed to approve of privatizing 
a World War I cross memorial as a means of curing its previously 
                                                                                                                  
9 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141–42 (Souter, J., concurring).  
10 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (finding no Establishment Clause 
violation when the city displayed a Christmas crèche alongside other holiday-themed 
decorations, such as a Santa statue, reindeer pulling a sleigh, and carolers).  
11 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141–42 (Souter, J., concurring).  
12 Id. at 1137. 
13 Id. at 1138. 
14 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, 10 Commandments vs. 7 Aphorisms: A New Religion Covets 
Legitimacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A14 (“[T]he subtext of the battle—a New Age 
religion seeking the same treatment as a more established faith.”); Editorial, A Case of Religious 
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A30 (arguing that “[p]ublic property . . . must be 
open to all religions on an equal basis — or open to none at all”). 
15 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132–34.  
16 Id. at 1134. 
17 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).  
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adjudicated Establishment Clause violation, while also averting the 
disrespect arguably conveyed by forced removal.18 Procedurally 
complex and lasting over a decade,19 Buono did not include a Free 
Speech claim, but the courts’ analysis of the cross’s meaning did 
include some related “government speech.” Soon after Buono filed 
his Establishment Clause claim, Congress designated the 
controversial cross in the Mojave Desert as a “National Memorial” 
commemorating U.S. participation in World War I.20 As discussed 
below, while the Justices mistakenly assumed that this Christian 
symbol was the only national monument honoring America’s WWI 
soldiers, they avoided the constitutional issue by construing the land 
transfer statute as allowing removal of the cross.21  
Therefore, while neither case presented an immediate need for 
answers, both Summum and Buono raised questions about the 
intersection of speech and religion—foreshadowing a more direct 
collision between two shifting doctrines. One way of framing the 
analysis is by evaluating the pensive puzzle left behind by Justice 
Souter:  
But the government could well argue, as a development of 
government speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own 
views, it is free of the Establishment Clause’s stricture 
against discriminating among religious sects or groups. . . .  
 Whether that view turns out to be sound is more than I can 
say at this point.22  
Given his long history of championing strict religious neutrality,23 this 
statement from his Summum concurrence is fairly interpreted as a 
prediction, not a proposal.  
                                                                                                                  
18 Id. at 1820.  
19 The litigation has generated five published decisions and is now on remand in the 
district court. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono I), aff’d, 371 
F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono II); Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(Buono III), aff’d sub. nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV), 
rev’d sub. nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Buono). 
20 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 
2230, 2278 (2002).  
21 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817–18, 1823 (Alito, J., concurring); see also discussion infra 
Part III. 
22 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). This statement was all the more puzzling because the majority opinion 
expressly noted, in passing, “government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.” 
Id. at 1132. 
23 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 737 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality toward religion as a general rule); 
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (“‘A proper respect for both the Free 
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ 
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This Symposium Article examines the multiple interpretations of 
Justice Souter’s parting words by exploring hypothetical illustrations 
of the anticipated, post-Summum clash of doctrines. In doing so, it 
builds on two prior papers with more normative agendas. In an article 
analyzing Summum, I applied Professor Lawrence Lessig’s work on 
social meaning to argue that the opinion exacerbates the 
Establishment Clause impact of religious-historical public symbols.24 
Especially given the changed, more combative culture, I proposed 
drawing a sharp line between preserving monuments erected in more 
homogenous times—which should be allowed only if accompanied 
by sufficient explanatory disclaimers—and new government display 
of religious symbols, which generally should be prohibited.25 A 
second article, commenting on the Buono decision, showed how 
Justices Kennedy and Alito’s opinions could be interpreted as using 
an “expanded endorsement test.”26 By their account, the “reasonable 
observer” would understand that government action to avoid 
destroying or removing a historic-religious symbol conveys a 
different message than would a government’s erection of a Christian 
symbol today.27  
It is this distinction between old and new—with its intriguing hint 
of an achievable compromise28—that focused my attention on 
Congress’s 2002 designation of the Mojave Desert Cross as a 
“National Memorial” commemorating World War I. Although 
occurring during the Buono Establishment Clause litigation, it was 
not directly at issue in the case. Accordingly, and because the 
complicated procedural maneuverings took center stage, this 
                                                                                                                  
 
toward religion . . . .’” (quoting Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973))).  
24  See Dolan, supra 6, at 52–57 (discussing how the government speech label more clearly 
“ties” the government to a monument, while extinguishing the private donor’s role “de-
ambiguates” the monument’s social meaning) (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 949 (1995)). 
25  Id. at 65–69 (providing extensive, detailed requirements for such disclaimers, and 
caveats for situations where new minority-religion monuments are proposed to dilute an older 
monument’s religious meaning). 
26  Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2010). 
27  Id. at 46 (also suggesting that this may be the most viewer-centered alternative 
available, given the current, more conservative Court, and the lesser option of a reductive, fixed 
historical approach). 
28  Based on their opinions in Buono and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), six 
Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) are 
likely to resist ripping out longstanding religious statuary from public squares. See, e.g., Salazar 
v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (“The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does 
not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm”) (Kennedy, J., plurality 
opinion). 
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religiously themed government speech was underanalyzed. One 
unique contribution of this Article is new research on the Mojave 
Cross designation, the general process for creating National 
Memorials, and the broader range of WWI national memorials.29  
Interesting in its own right, simply for the additional light cast on a 
recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause case, this National 
Memorial designation also provides a platform from which to explore 
the puzzle presented. Because the designation process turns out to 
involve substantial private participation—and to be somewhat ad hoc, 
nonselective, and political—it provides a nice hypothetical. While 
admittedly a long shot, it is a useful exercise to imagine a rejected 
speaker claiming that Congress has created a “National Memorial 
forum” and then suing, in the alternative, on both Free Speech and 
Establishment Clause grounds. As explained below, there are other 
credible candidates for WWI National Memorials, including a 
longstanding secular monument and a tribute to Jewish WWI 
veterans. 
The examples worked through in this Article show that the 
addition of a Free Speech Clause “government speech” defense is 
likely to provide a mostly incremental, evidentiary difference. As 
compared to that common Establishment Clause actor, the offended 
observer, a rejected speaker-plaintiff, standing alone, will tend to 
function as a truth-tester for a government’s proffered secular 
rationale. But even so, the added punch of forcing a government to 
argue affirmatively that a particular religion—and not the rejected 
other—best symbolizes the government’s identity should prove even 
harder to justify.30 In a doctrinal area as notoriously contextual as the 
                                                                                                                  
29 All this original research on National Memorials, including the Mojave Cross 
designation discussed in Buono, was sent to the attorneys for both parties (Counsels of Record 
in the Salazar v. Buono District Court remand) upon completion in July, 2010; also, in October, 
2010, when the unpublished research paper was posted on SSRN, see Mary Jean Dolan, P.S. 
Untold Stories and the Cross National Memorial (Oct. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1697483), copies were mailed to both Counsel and 
the District Court Judge.  
30 Note that Summum did attempt to force the City into this position, by asking the 
Supreme Court to require the City to official adopt the meaning of the Ten Commandments as 
its own message, but the Court declined to do. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 
1125, 1134 (2009). That case, however, did not involve a binary choice, or even the Ten 
Commandments, specifically, but rather the First Amendment categorization, generally, of all 
donated monuments displayed in the City’s Pioneer Park (and, by extension, all donated 
monuments in public parks). 
This Article brackets two types of government religious speech, legislative prayer 
(allowed as uniquely historical) and “ceremonial deism” (historical practices, e.g., the use of 
“under God” on U.S. currency, which have been explained away as rote phrases that have lost 
religious significance over time). While each can be distinguished from the symbols analyzed in 
Summum and Buono based on their unique features, to do so would require extended 
explanation, which would be distracting here. For comprehensive analysis of these two issues, 
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Establishment Clause, it is more effective to show, rather than to 
simply tell, these conclusions. 
First, this Article briefly reviews how Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum expanded the “government speech doctrine” to include 
broad “identity” messages. The second Section explores several 
possible interpretations of Justice Souter’s melancholy reflections. 
Third, the Article provides the necessary background from Salazar v. 
Buono. Next, the Article sets forth the new National Memorial 
research and evaluates whether the Mojave Cross National Memorial, 
standing alone, violates the Establishment Clause. Finally, the last 
Section considers what would be added to the analysis if Congress 
were to refuse National Memorial status to the alternative WWI 
symbols, while continuing to bestow that honor on the small cross in 
the desert. 
I. A BRIEF PERSPECTIVE ON SUMMUM’S EXPANSION  
OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum is especially significant because, 
for the first time, the Court extended the developing “government 
speech doctrine” to situations where the government joins with 
private partners to express broad, thematic government “identity 
messages.”31 Earlier cases upheld “government speech” defenses 
against Free Speech Clause claims that involved established federal 
programs, which had specific, objective government policies (anti-
abortion and promoting beef consumption).32 Summum also, 
                                                                                                                  
 
see, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change 
in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2009); Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and 
the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010). 
31 See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 4 (“‘[I]dentity speech’ can be 
loosely defined as expression that is consistent with a government’s identified or desired image 
and values, especially communitarian and promotional themes.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
International Municipal Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners at 12–13, Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter IMLA Brief] (IMLA’s 
“Municipal Practice Examples” showed how governments’ decisions regarding monuments 
“express community ideals at the time of installation.”). For supporting quotes from the 
Summum opinion, see infra note 37.  
32 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (holding that a compelled 
subsidy to pay for pro-beef advertising was protected government speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that a prohibition of Title X funding recipients from providing 
abortion counseling did not violate the First Amendment). The Circuit Courts, however, have 
been dealing with claims of broad, thematic “government speech” for some time, see, e.g., Ariz. 
Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (specialty license plates); Wells v. 
City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (private sponsors and city’s 
holiday display), but the Court did not address or adopt the Circuit Courts’ government speech 
tests. 
Also, in a related doctrine, the ”speech selection cases,” the Court has allowed the 
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correspondingly, relaxed the “government control” requirement for 
messages originating with a private speaker, finding “final approval 
authority” to be sufficient.33  
In some ways, Summum was an easy case, as indicated by its 9-0 
outcome. The Tenth Circuit held that because the City had displayed 
some donated monuments in its public park, and parks are traditional 
public forums for speech, it was required to display all private 
monuments on a content-neutral basis.34 While this seemed a 
ridiculous outcome, the Court also declined to use limited public 
forum analysis, even though it seemed applicable.35 Atypically, 
Pleasant Grove City had a reasonably consistent practice, later put 
into a written policy, of displaying in Pioneer Park only donations 
that either related to local history or were contributed by local 
organizations. Summum, a small religion based in Salt Lake City (and 
an experienced Ten Commandments litigator), fit neither category. 
Nonetheless, allowing a government to use “content limitations,” 
such as “local history,” would have been of little use in the monument 
context. Governments sought to be free of “viewpoint neutrality” too, 
in order to defend standard monument-context decisions, such as 
erecting a war memorial, but declining a statue portraying the war’s 
foreign casualties.36  
And so, the Court’s decision in Summum emphasized that, in 
choosing to accept and display privately donated monuments, a 
government intends to convey some message—and that message is 
                                                                                                                  
 
government to make content-based—but not viewpoint-based—decisions regarding which 
private speakers to feature or fund when it acts in certain institutional capacities. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that requiring the NEA to take 
into consideration respect for diverse beliefs in determining grant applications did not violate 
Free Speech Clause); see also Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 14–24 
(discussing the several types of “government speech” cases in depth). In fact, a wide variety of 
constitutional cases can be characterized as involving questions of government speech. See, e.g., 
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1377 (2001) (analyzing eight categories of cases in which government speech problems 
have arisen); Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 833 (2010) (analyzing 
numerous cases involving expression that is attributed, or misattributed, to the government). 
33 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61). In contrast, the 
Johanns opinion had emphasized the government’s control over “every word” of the beef 
advertisement. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561–62.  
34 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007). 
35 The limited public forum doctrine allows government to open up its property, but only 
for certain, specified types of content or speakers. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 
F.3d 1170, 1171, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). For an in-depth explanation and critique of the Summum Court’s treatment of forum 
doctrine, see Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 40–44. 
36 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137–38 (deciding that forum analysis was unworkable because 
then, by accepting the Statue of Liberty, the United States would have been obligated to accept 
and display a “Statue of Autocracy”).  
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one which the decision makers have determined is consistent with the 
relevant community’s desired image and perceived identity.37 The 
Court also stressed that governments are “selective” in deciding 
whether to accept a donation because they do not wish to display 
“permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do 
not wish to be associated.”38 The opinion also relied heavily on the 
conclusion that observers will “reasonably” interpret donated 
monuments “as conveying some message on the [government] 
property owner’s behalf.” 39  
In many expressive contexts with mixed public-private roles 
(including permanent monuments in public parks), something like the 
government speech doctrine seems necessary—or at least a good fit 
with intuitively appealing outcomes.40 But it is not only legal scholars 
who appear discomfited by the lack of limits on government speech, 
particularly given the broad concepts the Court used in Summum. The 
Justices, too, appear to be groping for ways to replace the fading lines 
of forum doctrine with an alternative means of cabining governmental 
discretion.41 Justice Alito, for example, noted with approval Pleasant 
Grove City’s now-written criteria for monument selection.42 But this 
is a red herring because: (i) these criteria would not have provided the 
very discretion that was granted by the Summum decision, and 
(ii) written policies are not likely to become the norm in this sporadic 
context, where years, and administrations, may pass before the next 
installation, or offer, of a new monument.  
Justice Breyer’s concurrence proposed his own rule: governments’ 
monument selections must be made according to “criteria reasonably 
                                                                                                                  
37 Three key statements from the Court’s opinion support this characterization. First, the 
Court wrote that whether a government commissions a monument, or displays a privately 
financed or initiated monument, “it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill 
some feeling in those who see the structure.” Id. at 1133. One main reason for finding that 
Pleasant Grove’s monuments were “government speech” was that: “[t]he City has selected those 
monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it 
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park . . . .” Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). And again, 
the City’s actions—taking ownership and putting the monument on permanent display in a park 
“that is linked to the City’s identity . . . unmistakably signify[] to all Park visitors that the City 
intends the monument to speak on its behalf.” Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 1133. 
39 Id. (“In this context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate the 
identity of the speaker.”).  
40 Compare Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253 (2011) 
(suggesting an alternative “speech platform” paradigm); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public 
Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357 (2001) (arguing for validity of limits on indecent 
and offensive speech in certain types of limited public forums). 
41 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665) (noting 
Justice Kennedy’s reference to the forum analysis alternatives as a “tyranny of labels”). 
42  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
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related” to the park’s “legitimate ends.”43 Their laudatory goal, it 
seems, is to limit the risk that the “government speech doctrine” will 
be used to disguise, or excuse, governmental religious discrimination 
and other unconstitutional acts. This Article suggests that a rejected, 
nonmajority-religion speaker, who cannot be explained away by a 
religion-neutral criterion, may serve that purpose well.  
II. EXAMINING JUSTICE SOUTER’S PENSIVE PUZZLE 
Returning to Justice Souter’s thought-provoking words, this 
Section examines the possible meanings of his conjecture that the 
developing government speech doctrine may allow government to 
argue: “when [government] expresses its own views, it is free of the 
Establishment Clause’s stricture against discriminating among 
religious sects or groups. . . .44 Because this “doctrine” refers to a 
government’s defense to a Free Speech Clause claim, the 
confrontation doctrines will be most clear where, in a single lawsuit, 
the plaintiff claims both a Free Speech violation—e.g., based on 
exclusion from an alleged forum—and also claims that if the 
government asserts the “government speech” defense, then its speech 
violates the Establishment Clause by favoring one religion over 
another.45  
The question after Summum was what, if anything, its government 
speech holding would add if Summum also claimed that the City’s 
Ten Commandments display violates the Establishment Clause. The 
commentators were split, but many agreed (often grudgingly, to be 
sure) with Justice Scalia’s preemptive proclamation: the Summum 
decision would not change the outcome, based on Van Orden.46 In 
Van Orden, a plurality dismissed an offended observer’s 
Establishment Clause challenge to a donated Ten Commandments’ 
display on the Texas Capitol grounds, based on its allegedly secular 
                                                                                                                  
43 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to “legitimate ends” 
such as “recreational, historical, educational, aesthetic, and other civic interests”). Justice 
Breyer’s suggestion also appears potentially underinclusive.  
44  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
45  To sharpen the judicial focus further, it is also helpful to assume the same (or a 
relatively similar) government decision maker and social-cultural environment. Then, the Court 
would be directly reviewing a government’s binary, affirmative choice (e.g., “yes” to the 
Eagles’ Ten Commandments, “no” to the Summum’s Seven Aphorisms). 
46 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 690 (2005)); see also Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009) (concluding that an Establishment Clause challenge to Pleasant 
Grove City’s Ten Commandments display would not succeed due to Van Orden). But see Ian 
Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 43 (2009) (concluding that Van Orden is insufficient to deflect a claim that Pleasant 
Grove’s Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause).  
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historical purpose, and not by finding it private speech.47 An 
intermediate perspective might be that the presence of a rejected 
minority-religion speaker would make an Establishment Claim 
violation more likely, even given Van Orden.  
But in addition, I tend to think that in some circumstances, the 
very process of requiring a government first to argue on behalf of the 
religiously themed speech—to claim it affirmatively as representing 
the government’s own viewpoint—sometimes will make a difference. 
It may expose a government’s bluff. Where a case sits at the 
intersection of the government speech doctrine and Establishment 
Clause constraints, and both issues are before the court, the 
combination of arguments may act to flush out government’s 
religious preferences. The following series of hypotheticals, all of 
which are based on the concept of replaying the Pleasant Grove v. 
Summum lawsuit, illustrate the range of possible meanings of Justice 
Souter’s words.  
A. Scenario #1: No Secular Reason Offered— 
Government Openly States Its Religious Viewpoint 
In the two decades leading up to Justice Souter’s Summum 
concurrence, there was a significant shift toward allowing a greater 
blend between church and state.48 Accordingly, Justice Souter’s quote 
may simply express concern over the future success of Justice 
Scalia’s stated view: that the Establishment Clause permits 
governments to express their preference for monotheism and the God 
of the Bible.49 Imagine if Pleasant Grove City had rejected 
Summum’s Seven Aphorisms on the grounds that they are 
blasphemous. (Interestingly, it actually is a tenet of the Summum 
religion that God has proclaimed the Aphorisms superior to the 
Commandments.50) If the City then prevailed, using the “government 
speech defense,” then the new doctrine truly would have capsized 
                                                                                                                  
47 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690. Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence, however, 
undermines this view. Not only did he employ the endorsement test, with an added focus on the 
divisiveness of forced removal, id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring), but he relied in part on 
viewers’ perception of a secular message based on the identity of the donor, the Eagles. Id. at 
701–02. See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 30–32 (discussing this aspect 
of J. Breyer’s opinion). 
48 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that the new Court will continue the trend of abandoning traditional 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in favor of the integration of church and state). 
49 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(proclaiming that government is entitled to honor the Ten Commandments, in part because 
97.7% of Americans believe that these rules were given by God).  
50 See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, SUMMUM, http://www. 
summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).  
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settled Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Such an extreme 
outcome, however, seems both unlikely and more easily attributed to 
cultural/political pressure than to the evolution of this particular 
judicial doctrine.51  
B. Scenario #2: The Secular Reason Is a “Viewpoint-Neutral” 
Application of Reasonable “Content Limitations” 
On one account, the Summum facts themselves constitute religious 
discrimination; all that was missing was an Establishment Clause 
claim.52 But there, the City had provided a reasonable, religion-
neutral rationale: the Ten Commandments monument was donated by 
a local organization, which was one of the two criteria for display in 
the Park, and Summum was not local, nor did its monument depict 
local history.53 So, even with an Establishment Clause claim, there 
would be no call for the City to risk asserting that, based on the 
government speech doctrine, it was now “free” to express its own 
discriminatory views on religion. 
C. Scenario #3: The Stated Secular Reason Is Viewpoint-
Discriminatory, but May be Justified  
Without Reference to Religion 
Next consider a situation where the rejected, religiously themed 
display did relate to Pleasant Grove City’s local history, but in an 
objectively negative way. Assume, hypothetically, that the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), 
which continues to practice polygamy today, had deep roots in the 
City, although for decades its members had lived in a remote 
location.54 Imagine that the FLDS descendants of the City’s original 
                                                                                                                  
51 See, e.g., Gregory A. Boyd, THE MYTH OF A CHRISTIAN NATION: HOW THE QUEST FOR 
POLITICAL POWER IS DESTROYING THE CHURCH (2005) (setting forth the players and the 
problems); Teddy Davis & Matt Loffman, Sarah Palin’s ‘Christian Nation’ Remarks Spark 
Debate, ABC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sarah-palin-sparks-church-
state-separation-debate/story?id=10419289 (discussing the ensuing debate sparked when 
conservative politician Sarah Palin called America a “Christian Nation” and noted that she 
rejects separation of church and state). 
52  See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant 
First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23 (2010). 
53  See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
54 Note that Pleasant Grove City is one of the original Mormon settlements, started by a 
group commissioned for that purpose by Brigham Young himself. See Pleasant Grove History, 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, http://www.plgrove.org/arts-a-education/pleasant-grove-history (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2011). Mormon polygamy has a longstanding, but highly controversial history. 
Outlawing this religious practice was a condition of Utah statehood; the required renunciation 
split the Church; and the splinter group, the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints (FLDS), still engages in polygamy today. See MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM, 
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settlers donated a statute of a man with many wives and children for 
display in the park, and the City rejected this offer. Application of a 
viewpoint-neutral “local history” criterion would not help the City 
prevail in court, but the government speech defense approved in 
Summum would.  
This could be one type of case to which Justice Souter referred, 
because the City’s rejection of the FLDS statue would be viewed by 
some as government discrimination against a disliked religious 
group.55 But the statue honors conduct that has been unlawful for over 
a century, and which portrays a painful chapter in Utah history. It 
seems more likely a court would hold that drawing this distinction is 
unrelated to religious discrimination, and therefore does not violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
Similar doctrinal conflict can be anticipated in the current context 
of increasing expressive activism by atheist organizations. The legally 
interesting case is where a government rejects antagonistic speech, 
specifically, speech that arguably attacks others’ religious beliefs.56 
Actually, one of the first Circuit Court “government speech” cases, 
Wells v. City and County of Denver, held that Denver’s holiday 
display was government speech.57 The court thus allowed the city to 
exclude an atheist group’s sign, which declared: “[t]here are no gods” 
and “the ‘Christ Child’ is a religious myth.”58 Arguably, the 
government’s response was religion-neutral, done to preserve the 
display’s celebratory spirit, rather than to malign atheism.59 
                                                                                                                  
 
http://www.mormonfundamentalism.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (providing a historical 
and doctrinal examination of Mormon Fundamentalism). For a thorough account of Mormon 
polygamy, from its origins in the early 19th Century to current fundamentalist outposts, see 
RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY (2d ed. 1989). 
55 A growing number of legal scholars are criticizing laws banning polygamy as based in 
religious and cultural discrimination. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold 
Story of America's Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287 (2010); Jonathan Turley, 
Polygamy Laws Expose Our Own Hypocrisy, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (Oct. 3, 2004), 
http://jonathanturley.org/2007/08/20/polygamy-laws-expose-our-own-hypocrisy/.  
56  See, e.g., Mallory Simon, Missing Atheist Sign Found in Washington State, CNN.COM 
(Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/12/05/atheists.christmas/ (last visited May 4, 
2011) (story about, and photo of, a large sign posted by the Freedom From Religion Foundation, 
alongside a Nativity scene in a holiday display at the State of Washington Legislative Building, 
stating: “There are no gods. . . . Religion is but myth and superstition that hardens hearts and 
enslaves minds”). 
57  257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).  
58  Id. at 1137. 
59  Id.  
59  Of course, any time a government asserts an ostensibly religion-neutral rationale for 
excluding a minority group’s message on religion, the use of such fine distinctions will be 
controversial, especially where the group faces discrimination even where engaged in 
expression that is clearly context-appropriate. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and 
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D. Scenario #4: The Stated Secular Reason Is Viewpoint-
Discriminatory, and Cannot Clearly Be Justified  
Without Reference to Religion 
The core problem identified by Justice Souter will present where 
there are no easy escapes: no relatively objective, secular reason that 
is clearly distinct from religious preference. The clash of doctrines is 
most apparent where a government relies on Summum’s broad 
“government identity speech” concept, but its asserted reason for 
selection cannot be distinguished from the community’s religious 
identity.  
To illustrate, suppose that Pleasant Grove City was offered two 
religious symbols for display. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints’ (LDS or Mormons) headquarters donated a large replica 
of the golden plates (a central aspect of the Mormon foundation 
story).60 Around the same time, the descendants of the City’s first 
non-Mormon church donated a similarly sized Christian cross, with a 
plaque explaining its local historical import. Say the City chose to 
display the golden plates, and reject the cross—and then defended its 
decision as a closer fit with the City’s image.61  
If the City asserted government speech as its defense to the non-
Mormon church’s Free Speech Clause claim, this would be a 
paradigmatic example of “government identity speech” that cannot be 
explained without reference to religion. And so, the City would be in 
the precise position Justice Souter described, arguing to the court that 
because the monument-display decision was “government speech,” it 
was entitled to express its own and the community’s viewpoint—in 
favor of the Mormon-majority plates. Because such an affirmative act 
of religious preference would violate the Establishment Clause, to 
defend this result, the government would need to argue that under the 
new government speech doctrine, “when [government] expresses its 
                                                                                                                  
 
Government Religious Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1797804) (describing discrimination faced by atheists in America). 
60  LDS stands for The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints; the LDS 
headquarters is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. For a brief history, see http://lds.org/church 
history/history/0,15486,3943-1-2104,00.html.  
61 Note that the Christian cross is not a central symbol for Mormons. See Am. Atheists, 
Inc. v. Duncan, No. 08-4061, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26936 at *26 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) 
(holding that Utah Highway Patrol’s 12-foot memorial crosses on shoulder of highway violated 
the Establishment Clause). Recall the Court’s explanations in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City: 
“The City has selected those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting 
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park.” 129 S. Ct. 1125, 
1134 (2009) (emphasis added).  
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own views, it is free of the Establishment Clause’s stricture against 
discriminating among religious sects or groups.”62  
Of course, the more disliked, unusual, or small the religious 
minority group whose symbol the government would like to reject, 
the more seductive this approach will be. To continue this thought 
experiment, what if Summum had been a local minority religion, with 
its historical origins in Pleasant Grove City? The City likely still 
would have preferred to reject the Seven Aphorisms monument based 
on the group’s unusual—but not illegal—practices (e.g., mummifying 
household pets and worshiping in a backyard pyramid63). Exploring 
these points of intersection, between the government speech defense 
and the norm of government neutrality on religion, reveals the 
difficulties ahead.64  
III. BUONO’S CROSSED SIGNALS: TRANSFERRING THE LAND,  
YET CREATING A NEW NATIONAL MEMORIAL  
Salazar v. Buono stretched over a decade of procedurally complex 
litigation, and yielded six Supreme Court opinions, but still resulted in 
remand with directions to the district court to re-do its “endorsement 
test” analysis.65 This Section provides only a brief sketch—just 
enough to provide background for the National Memorial issue, and 
to show the endorsement test’s current contours.  
At issue was Congress’s attempt to transfer to a private owner, the 
local Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”), the parcel of federal land 
underneath the challenged cross war memorial.66 The original white 
cross on Sunrise Rock was erected in 1934 by a group of World War I 
veterans, members of the VFW post in this remote area. Originally, 
the cross bore a sign that identified it as a war memorial, and set out 
its origin.67 Over the years, the cross was replaced, but the sign was 
                                                                                                                  
62 Summum, at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring). 
63 See Modern Mummification for Pets & Animals, SUMMUM, http://www.summum.us/ 
mummification/pets/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
64 This Article is directed at the questions rather than potential solutions, and thus, I will 
not discuss here the efficacy of various proposals, including the disclaimer idea on which I have 
previously written. Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 49–73.  
65  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Kennedy, J., plurality); id. at 1821 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (two-sentence opinion calling the sale an “empty ritual”); id. (Alito, J., 
concurring) (objecting to remand); id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by J. Thomas) 
(Buono lacked standing to appeal Buono IV); id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting on merits) 
(joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor); id. at 1842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (based on the 
“law of injunctions,” Court should have deferred to district court’s interpretation of its 
injunction). 
66 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16 (noting that the proposed land swap is with a private 
citizen named Harry Sandoz, who has agreed to transfer the land to the VFW, as part of his 
promise to his dying friend, one of the WWI veterans who erected the original cross memorial).  
67 Id. at 1812. 
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not; and most years, the site was used for a sunrise Easter service.68 In 
1994, Congress designated a large swath of desert, including this 
location, as the “Mojave Desert Preserve.”69  
When Frank Buono sued, asserting that allowing a cross display on 
federal land violated the Establishment Clause, the federal district 
court agreed and enjoined the cross’s continued display.70 During this 
time period, Congress responded to the lawsuit by passing a bill that 
prohibited using federal funds to remove the cross.71 Then, while 
Buono I was pending, Congress passed the 2002 National Memorial 
Act, which provided:  
The five-foot-tall white cross first erected by the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars of the United States in 1934 . . . now located 
within the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve . . . is 
hereby designated as a national memorial commemorating 
United States participation in World War I and honoring the 
American veterans of that war.72 
The Act also required the government to acquire and install a 
replica of the original wooden cross and the 1934 plaque, using up to 
$10,000 of funds appropriated for administration of the Mojave 
Desert Preserve.73 The original plaque, which was to be replicated, 
                                                                                                                  
68 Id.  
69 See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–433, § 502, 108 Stat. 
4471, 4890 (establishing the Mojave National Preserve). A “National Preserve” works to 
preserve open space similarly to a “National Park,” while continuing to allow more private uses 
of the land. See generally U.S. NAT’L PARK SERVICE (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.nps.gov/ 
(providing information about the National Park Service).  
The government’s passivity toward a cross on federal land for so many decades prior to 
this litigation may suggest tacit approval, but it actually is quite ambiguous in the context of 
Western land-use practices. According to an article on controversies over the use of presidential 
declarations of National Monuments, “[a]pproximately 27.7% of the land area of the United 
States, or some 630 million acres, is under federal ownership,” and “[h]istorically, absent 
withdrawal or reservation for specific purposes, federal lands were considered to be in the 
public domain,” originally, open for settlement, and generally, open for public use. Albert C. 
Lin, Clinton’s National Monuments: A Democrat’s Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 
709 (2002) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 208 (121st ed. 2001)). 
70 Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d. 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono I), aff’d, 371 F.3d 
543 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono II). 
71 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-230 (2000) (“None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of 
the Interior to remove the five-foot tall white cross located within the boundary of the Mojave 
National Preserve . . . .”). 
72 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115 
Stat. 2230, 2278 (2002).  
73 Id. § 8137(c) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall use not more than $10,000 of funds 
available for the administration of the Mojave National Preserve to acquire a replica of the 
original  memorial plaque and cross placed at the national World War I memorial designated by 
subsection (a) and to install the plaque in a suitable location on the grounds of the memorial.”).  
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had declared: “The Cross, Erected in Memory of the Dead of All 
Wars,” and “Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of Foregin [sic] 
Wars, Death Valley post 2884.”74 Finally, to avert removal of the 
Cross on a long-term basis, Congress enacted the Land Transfer 
Act.75 When Frank Buono went back to court to stop the proposed 
land transfer, the district court issued a permanent injunction against 
its implementation, finding that Congress’s transfer statute was an 
illicit attempt to evade the court’s original injunction. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed,76 bringing the validity of the land transfer before the 
Court in Buono.  
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion reversed and remanded, 
strongly urging the district court to conclude that once the cross was 
on private land, the reasonable observer would no longer view the 
cross as conveying governmental endorsement of Christianity.77 Both 
the plurality and Justice Alito’s concurrence emphasized that a 
government’s effort to preserve a religious symbol with a specific, 
secular, historical meaning is unlikely to be viewed by a “well-
informed observer” as a government endorsement of religion.78 They 
also agreed that the social meaning of a symbol derives from its 
historical era; when erected, the Cross’s meaning as a WWI war 
memorial would have been clearly evident.79 Significantly, Justice 
                                                                                                                  
74 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (quoting Buono v. Kempthorne, 
527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
75 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa–56 (2006). Additionally, in 2003, Congress had passed another bill 
prohibiting the cross’s removal. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 107–248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002).  
76 Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181–82 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Buono III), aff’d 
sub. nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV), rev’d sub. nom. 
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Buono). 
77 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“The court made no inquiry 
into the effect that knowledge of the transfer of the land to private ownership would have had on 
any perceived governmental endorsement of religion”). 
78 See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring) (the “well-informed observer” 
would appreciate that the land transfer was the government’s attempt to “eliminate any 
perception of religious sponsorship,” while avoiding the “disturbing symbolism associated with 
the destruction of the historic monument.”); id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). For 
additional textual support for this interpretation, along with discussion of the limitations of such 
an “expanded” endorsement test, see, Dolan, Endorsement and History, supra note 26. 
79 Noting that the original reason WWI veterans installed the cross was “to commemorate 
American war dead,” Justice Alito wrote: 
[P]articularly for those with searching memories of The Great War, the symbol that 
was selected, a plain  unadorned white cross, no doubt evoked the unforgettable 
image of the white crosses, row on row, that  marked the final resting places of so 
many American soldiers who fell in that conflict. 
Id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also id. at 1820 
(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking 
the graves of Americans who fell in battles . . . .”); cf. Cemeteries, AMERICAN BATTLE 
MONUMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries.php (last visited Mar. 
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Alito noted that a reasonable observer could easily distinguish the 
social meaning of the transfer of a 70-year-old cross war memorial 
from the new “construction of an official World War I memorial on 
the National Mall.”80 Stressing “the highly fact-specific nature” of a 
“proper” endorsement inquiry, the Court remanded the issue to the 
district court for consideration of “all of the pertinent facts and 
circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”81  
Congress’s 2002 designation of the Mojave Cross as a “National 
Memorial” seems particularly “pertinent” to unraveling this multi-
layered controversy.82 The lower court opinions, and the majority of 
Justices who addressed it, focused on whether it meant that, even 
post-land transfer, the federal government would retain control over 
the land and the cross.83 The Justices dismissed its impact by means 
of statutory construction, relying on the text of the controversial 
reversionary clause in the Land Transfer Act. That clause required the 
VFW to maintain the land as “a” WWI war memorial.84 Ignoring the 
clear implications of the long saga to keep the Mojave Cross on 
Sunrise Rock,85 they concluded that the Land Transfer Act gave the 
                                                                                                                  
 
28, 2011) (providing lists and photos of overseas military cemeteries). 
80 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable observer would not 
view the land exchange as the equivalent of the construction of an official World War I 
memorial on the National Mall”). These hints of Justices Alito and Kennedy’s opinions are 
important because each is likely to continue playing key roles in future decisions involving 
religion. 
81 Id. at 1819–20 (plurality opinion) (stating that the district court should do this inquiry 
“in the first instance”).  
82 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–117, § 8137, 115 
Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002). 
83 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819–20; Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(Buono IV). 
84 The relevant provision of the 2003 Land Transfer Act appeared to restrict future use of 
the property only to use as “a” war memorial (and not, specifically, as the “white cross” war 
memorial named in the earlier National Memorial Act): 
(e) REVERSIONARY CLAUSE.—The conveyance under subsection (a) shall be 
subject to the condition that the recipient maintain the conveyed property as a 
memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring 
the American veterans of that war. If the Secretary determines that the conveyed 
property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert 
to the ownership of the United States.  
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat. 
1054, 1100 (2003) (emphasis added). 
85 The intensity of this fight is clear from the continued post-decision drama. First, the 
cross was stolen, allegedly to protect the Court’s decision, and VFW-sympathizers quickly 
erected a replacement cross, also by cover of night. See Caroline Black, Mojave Cross Honoring 
U.S. War Dead Stolen in Middle of the Night, CBSNEWS.COM, May 12, 2010, http://www. 
cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004719-504083.html; Anonymous Letter Explaining Cross 
Theft Sent to Desert Dispatch, DESERTDISPATCH.COM (May 11, 2010, 5:27 PM), http://www. 
desertdispatch.com/articles/explaining-8465-anonymous-letter.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011); 
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VFW complete freedom to replace the cross with a different kind of 
WWI war memorial.86  
Whether the National Memorial designation itself violates the 
Establishment Clause is a new and distinct issue. Only Justice 
Stevens’ dissent addressed its significance.87 He interpreted the Act as 
a congressional declaration that the Mojave Cross is “the” World War 
I National Memorial, thus granting the desert cross a status equivalent 
to the National Mall’s iconic symbols: the Washington Monument, 
the Lincoln Memorial, and the Vietnam and WWII memorials.88 If 
Justice Stevens’ interpretation was accurate, if Congress has chosen 
                                                                                                                  
 
Mojave War Memorial Torn Down by Vandals!, LIBERTYINSTITUTE.ORG, http://www.liberty 
institute.org/current_cases.php?category=6&article=67 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). NPS 
responded by removing the cross as a violation of court orders—after refraining from doing just 
that during the many years during the litigation. (The cross had been covered by a cardboard 
box.) See Replica Cross Mysteriously Appears in Mojave: Authorities Call it Illegal and 
Remove it from Federal Preserve, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 2010, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37261550; Park Service Removes Mojave Cross Replica, 
CBN.COM, May 21, 2010, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/May/Stolen-Mojave-Desert-
Cross-Returned/. Since then, veterans and conservative Christian organizations have 
campaigned loudly for the cross to be restored. See, e.g., LIBERTY INSTITUTE, PUT THE CROSS 
BACK!, http://www.putthecrossback.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).  
86 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Congress did not prevent the VFW from supplementing the existing monument or 
replacing it with a war memorial of a different design.”); id. at 1826 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (stating that it is “merely speculative” to assert that the VFW will keep up the 
cross because “[n]othing in the statutes compels the VFW (or any future proprietor) to keep it 
up”); id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the land transfer statute “does not 
categorically require the new owner of the property to display the existing 
memorial[,] . . . [although it] most certainly encourages this result”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court (joined only by Chief Justice Roberts) avoided addressing the issue, merely noted 
in passing, as if an interesting fortuity, that “Congress ultimately designated the cross as a 
national memorial, ranking it among those monuments honoring the noble sacrifices that 
constitute our national heritage.” Id. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
87 See id. at 1841–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Stevens’ point was not to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the designation per se, but rather to provide additional support 
for his position that the land transfer to the VFW would be insufficient to cure the previously 
adjudicated religious endorsement. Id. at 1837–38. 
88 Id. at 1841–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As far as I can tell, however, it is 
unprecedented in the Nation's history to designate a bare, unadorned cross as the national war 
memorial for a particular group of veterans. Neither the Korean War Memorial, the Vietnam 
War Memorial, nor the World War II Memorial commemorates our veterans’ sacrifice in 
sectarian or predominantly religious ways. Each of these impressive structures pays equal 
respect to all members of the Armed Forces who perished in the service of our Country in those 
conflicts. In this case, by contrast, a sectarian symbol is the memorial. And because Congress 
has established no other national monument to the veterans of the Great War, this solitary cross 
in the middle of the desert is the national World War I memorial.”) (second emphasis added); 
see also Brief of Respondent at 38, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (“As a national 
memorial, the cross is in a select group. There are only 45 other national memorials in the 
United States, and the list features some of the nation’s most significant and iconic symbols, 
including the Washington Monument, the Jefferson Memorial, the Lincoln Memorial, the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the United States Marine Corps Memorial, the Flight 93 
Memorial, and Mount Rushmore.”). 
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to honor only the Christian military sacrifice in WWI,89 then the 
National Memorial designation would almost certainly violate the 
Establishment Clause. Under that account, any reasonable observer 
would conclude that the 2002 Act conveys a Christian bias, and that 
Congress showed indifference to its harsh, exclusionary message.  
 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE  
MOJAVE CROSS WWI NATIONAL MEMORIAL  
 
Compiling the National Memorial story from various facts in the 
published decisions and media reports looks even worse. Not only 
was it assumed that Congress intentionally chose a Christian cross as 
the Nation’s WWI symbol, but in the same 2002 Act, Congress 
directed the federal government to pay for and install a new, 
replacement cross monument. Also, unlike the three other legislative 
actions supporting the Mojave Cross during the Buono litigation, this 
Act’s purpose was not directed at saving the cross from imminent 
removal. That this new honor was both superfluous to the 
preservation goal, and granted in the face of an Establishment Clause 
lawsuit, suggests disregard for the appearance of religious 
endorsement. Moreover, this same cross war memorial had earlier 
failed to qualify for the National Registry of Historic Places, which—
in contrast to the National Memorial honor—is governed by objective 
standards and expert selection.90 Proclaiming a new National 
Memorial, a designation shared by iconic symbols, appears to be a 
fundamental tool for creating, and publicly affirming, the national 
identity. As a result, its timing, immediately post-9/11, could raise 
suspicions that its intended message was to declare to the world that 
the United States is a Christian Nation. 
The research presented in this Section IV, however, constructs a 
strikingly different, more ambiguous narrative. On the whole, the new 
information either rebuts or shows no foundation for the charges 
                                                                                                                  
 89 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1842 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Government’s interest in 
honoring all those who have rendered heroic public service regardless of creed, as well as its 
constitutional responsibility to avoid endorsement of a particular religious view, should control 
wherever national memorials speak on behalf of our entire country.” (emphasis added)); see 
also Brief of Respondent at 40, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (“Because the cross is 
sectarian and specifies the divinity of Christ . . . [r]egardless of who owns the land on which the 
cross sits, its continuing designation as a national memorial excludes the contribution and 
sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of non-Christian World War I veterans and their families.”); 
Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations 
and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211 (2011). 
90  See infra Section IV.B.3. 
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above, although it does identify some new issues which could be used 
to build the case for an invalid preference.  
Because one goal of this Symposium Article is to explore the 
difference, if any, that would be made by the combination of an 
Establishment Clause and a Free Speech claim with a “government 
speech defense,” this Section IV will start by presenting the baseline 
inquiry. Does the 2002 National Memorial designation, standing 
alone, violate the Establishment Clause? Then, Section V will address 
the ultimate question of how the new government speech doctrine 
might affect this analysis.  
This Section is structured around the Lemon/endorsement test,91 
which continues to be the primary approach used by courts in 
symbolic speech cases.92 It begins by examining the traditional 
indicators for determining whether a statute had a “secular purpose,” 
and then presents most of the research findings as the contextual 
details used to assess “primary effect” and the appearance of 
governmental endorsement of religion. 
A. Secular or Religious Purpose? 
Under McCreary County, the Supreme Court’s most recent case 
decided on “purpose” grounds, legislative purpose is viewed through 
the eyes of an “‘objective observer,’ one who takes account of the 
traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, 
and implementation of the statute.’”93 Writing for the slim majority, 
Justice Souter counseled: “although a legislature’s stated reasons will 
generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be 
genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious 
objective.”94 
The text of the 2002 National Memorial Act states that Congress’s 
purpose is to “commemorat[e] United States participation in World 
                                                                                                                  
91  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (as modified by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997) (folding original three prong, excessive entanglement, into second prong); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying the Lemon test by asking 
how purpose and effect would appear to a reasonable observer). 
92  See, e.g., ACLU v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) (“As reformulated in 
recent years, the second prong of Lemon asks whether ‘the government action has the purpose 
or effect of endorsing religion.’”) (quoting ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 
2005)); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, No. 08-4061, 2010 WL 5151630, at *16-17 (10th Cir. 
Dec. 20, 2010) (applying the reformulated second prong of Lemon that asks “whether [the] 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion”) (quoting Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Both cases are recent examples 
of Circuit Courts applying the Lemon/endorsement inquiry. 
93 McCreary Ctny. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). 
94 Id. at 864. 
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War I and honor[] the American veterans of that war.”95 While the 
Act’s stated purpose is secular, it surely is debatable whether the 
commemorative symbol chosen transforms that purpose into a 
primarily sectarian one. The Act’s express reference to the cross’s 
provenance, however, performs multiple secularizing functions. The 
text expresses that the memorial was erected by a private, secular 
group, the VFW; also, the year of origin conveys its members’ likely 
status as WWI veterans and the memorial’s almost 70 years of 
history. Finally, the Act’s stated plan, to restore the explanatory 
plaque and provide a more historically accurate replica, suggests 
Congress’s intent to emphasize that war memorial history and correct 
the misimpression that it is merely a Christian cross displayed on 
federal land. 
Next, the Act has no legislative history at all. Indeed, the 
circumstances surrounding its passage suggest that few in Congress 
were even specifically aware of voting for it. The Mojave Cross 
National Memorial designation was but a few lines in an annual 
Defense Department appropriations bill. And this bill was 
exceptionally large based on its historic timing in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11.96 This January 2002 Defense Department 
behemoth also included three appropriations for the preservation of 
existing war memorials, and those (secular) grants were each in the 
$2–4 million range.97 
Nor did a fairly exhaustive search for any press releases or news 
coverage of the Act uncover any public statements suggesting that its 
legislative sponsor, Representative Jerry Lewis, had a religious 
motive. Rather, all such statements expressed only the intent to help 
preserve the Mojave Cross on Sunrise Rock, and focused repeatedly 
                                                                                                                  
95 Pub. L. No. 107–117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002). Section 8137(a) reads in 
full:  
DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL MEMORIAL.—The five-foot-tall white cross first erected 
by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States in 1934 . . . now located within 
the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve . . . is hereby designated as a national 
memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring 
the American veterans of that war. 
Id. 
96 See Helen Dewar, $4 Billion Shifted for Security, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A6–7 
(“[T]he Pentagon . . . received a $42 billion increase, the largest one-year increase in more than 
two decades, according to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd (D-
W.Va.).”).  
97 Pub. L. No. 107–117 §§ 8136(a), 8138–1839, 115 Stat. at 2278–79 (granting 
$2,100,000 for restoration of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, a WWI memorial in Marnes 
La-Coguette, France; $4,200,000 for the preservation of the former U.S.S. ALABAMA as a 
memorial; and $4,250,000 for the preservation of U.S.S. INTREPID as a memorial). 
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on the need to support veterans and respect military sacrifice.98 There 
is no evidence to analogize this situation to the few cases where the 
Court has found an Establishment Clause violation based on 
legislators’ manifest religious purpose.99  
 Also troubling, though not relevant to show Congress’s purpose in 
January 2002, is that Congress took similar action in 2004, when it 
designated the Mount Soledad Memorial in San Diego a “National 
Memorial.” The Mount Soledad cross memorial has been litigated for 
decades; recently, the Ninth Circuit held its display on federal land 
unconstitutional.100 While its National Memorial designation also was 
not at issue in the Mount Soledad litigation, there were legislators’ 
statements to review. The court interpreted their stated desire to 
preserve the cross as reflecting only their intent to respect the 
                                                                                                                  
98 See, e.g., Rene Sanchez, Cross Creates Desert Storm: ACLU, Park Service Debate 
Makeshift War Memorial, NAT’L ASS’N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, Dec. 9, 
2002, http://www.nathpo.org/News/Sacred_Sites/News-Sacred_Sites35.htm (“‘Preserving the 
cross is only about preserving a part of history in the desert,’ said Jim Specht, a spokesman for 
Lewis. ‘Residents out there have a very strong attachment to it as a war memorial, not as a 
religious symbol. People come from all over the desert to use it as a gathering point.’”); Lewis 
Advances Resolution Urging Return of Mojave Cross, VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS, Sept. 28, 
2010, http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/resolution-22043-advances-return.html (“It is time 
to give our veterans groups the ability to replace this important memorial to those who gave 
their lives to defend our nation and freedoms.” (quoting Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA))); Congress 
Condemns Theft of Mojave Cross Memorial, CHRISTIAN EXAMINER, Oct., 2010, http://www. 
christianexaminer.com/Articles/Articles%20Oct10/Art_Oct10_09.html (“‘Supporting our 
veterans is one of the top priorities for members of Congress, and I am grateful that my 
colleagues took this important measure up before we went out of session,’ said Lewis. 
‘Congress has repeatedly voted overwhelmingly to protect the Mojave Cross as a memorial to 
veterans and those who have died to defend our nation, and it is vital that we continue that 
support.’” (quoting Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA))).  
99 The Court has relied on the “purpose” prong only a handful of times. See McCreary 
Cnty, v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (religious purpose in posting Ten Commandments 
in courthouses); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (where a school’s 
policy, amended in response to litigation challenging long history of student-led prayer at high 
school football games, specified that one purpose of the student’s address was to “solemnize” 
the event, and suggested an “invocation”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching 
intelligent design in biology class); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (statute’s sponsor 
proclaimed his religious purpose for Alabama’s “moment of silence” law); Stone v. Graham, 
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (where a school posted the Ten Commandments in every 
classroom). 
100 See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that memorial 
cross on federal land violated Establishment Clause). The Ninth Circuit opinion sets forth the 
entire, multiple-case history, which stretched out over two decades. Id. at 1103–04. Following 
federal courts’ declaration that the cross display on city land violated the California 
Constitution, and later holdings that various efforts to save the cross memorial also were 
unconstitutional, Congress passed a law designating the Mount Soledad cross a National 
Memorial and authorizing the federal government to take ownership. Id. at 1104 (citing 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108–447, § 116, 118 Stat. 2809, 3346-47 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note)). Here, too, the honorary label appears extraneous; although 
for Mount Soledad, it arguably may have been necessary to establish a public purpose for 
eminent domain.  
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military, which it found a sufficiently “secular purpose.” 101 In sum, 
while it is always an elusive quest to find a viable “legislative” 
intent,102 there is insufficient evidence to show that the Mojave Cross 
National Memorial Act’s express, secular goal is a “sham” or “merely 
secondary to a religious objective.” 103 
While the Act’s timing may cause speculation as to motive, that 
alone likely is insufficient to show a religious purpose. As Justice 
Souter observed in McCreary, “A secret motive stirs up no strife and 
does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents. . . .”104 It is 
undeniable that Representative Lewis introduced the Act as part of his 
response to Frank Buono’s pending Establishment Clause lawsuit 
over the Mojave Cross; the Act was one of four bills he sponsored 
during his campaign to keep the cross war memorial at its original 
location.105 In addition, while to some, passage after 9/11 is consistent 
with the nation’s surge in patriotism, to others, that time period was 
infected with jingoism, often combined with religious fervor.  
                                                                                                                  
101 In Trunk v. City of San Diego, when analyzing the legislative purpose of the statute by 
which the federal government acquired a long-litigated cross war memorial, the Ninth Circuit 
initially stated that it found a secular purpose because the statute was directed at preserving the 
“war memorial” and did not specifically mention the cross. Id. at 1108. But even assuming the 
statute was ambiguous, the court found a predominantly secular purpose based on legislators’ 
statements on the floor, described above, which the court interpreted as expounding a secular, 
and not a religious, purpose. Id. at 1108–09. Perhaps because it was not at issue, the court made 
no mention of the suspicious timing of the Mount Soledad National Memorial designation, 
which also occurred during extended Establishment Clause litigation.   
 
102 For summaries of the critiques of the “secular purpose” requirement, and proposed 
amendments to the versions in various precedent, see, for example, Josh Blackman, This Lemon 
Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351 (2010) (arguing for statutory, over legislative, purpose, and rejecting of 
McCreary’s objective observer in favor of original public meaning); Andrew Koppelman, 
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 88 (2002) (arguing that the secular purpose requirement 
should allow government to favor religion generally, so long as it does not violate the axiom 
against declaring religious truth). 
103 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864; see also Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1118–22 (Ninth Circuit limited 
its “purpose” inquiry to the text and legislative history of the statute at issue there, and analyzed 
most facts as part of its broader “effects” inquiry, including facts showing that (unlike the 
Mojave Cross) Mount Soledad was created as a Christian monument, and only later, in response 
to litigation, acquired its current identity as a war memorial). 
104 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863. Justice Souter further explains, “If someone in the 
government hides religious motive so well that the ‘objective observer, acquainted with the text, 
legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ cannot see it, then without something 
more the government does not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking 
religious sides.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308).  
105 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106–554, § 133 app. D, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-230 (2000); see also Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 107–248, 
§ 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002) (“None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used 
to dismantle national memorials commemorating United States participation in World War I.”). 
The other two were the National Memorial designation act under discussion, and the Land 
Transfer Act. See supra Section III. 
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B. Appearance of Religious Endorsement? 
In assessing an act’s “primary effect,” the endorsement test 
employs the device of the “reasonable observer.” As the attributes of 
this “hypothetical construct” change over time—increasing in 
knowledge, and decreasing in sensitivity—criticism of the test has 
expanded.106 Still, it remains more sensitive to the impact on viewers, 
and to changing social contexts, than the backward-looking 
“tradition” approach. Moreover, it survived Salazar v. Buono.107 The 
Court’s most recent expression of the test, Justice Kennedy’s 
statement in Buono, is the most expansive yet: “That test requires the 
hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the 
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its 
placement.”108  
Some of the research on National Memorials presented below is 
not widely known, but all of it is publicly available. A “reasonable 
observer” challenging such a designation could be deemed aware of 
these background facts and laws, especially under the Buono 
formulation (one “who knows all” pertinent facts).109 Thus, this 
Article presents all the relevant information on National Memorials, 
including history that some courts might decide is a bit too obscure 
for attribution to the endorsement test’s hypothetical informed 
observer.  
1. The Nation’s Other WWI Memorials 
By far the most significant discovery is that the U.S. already 
commemorates World War I with several more impressive, and 
secular, national memorials. Surprisingly, over the past several 
                                                                                                                  
106 See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 72, 81 (2010) (“[W]ithout a reasonable observer who can discern a 
message of exclusion the endorsement test loses much of its content”). Another main critique of 
the endorsement test is that in practice, its “reasonable observer” is the judge’s usually 
majoritarian view, and thus inadequately fails its ostensible goal to protect non-adherents. See 
B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the 
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 521 (2005) (“[B]ecause the social context that 
produces meaning reflects the power structure of the larger society . . . the meaning discerned 
from [religious] displays will contain a majoritarian bias.”). See Dolan, Endorsement and 
History, supra note 26, at 46–47 (for description of test’s evolution). 
107 See Dolan, Endorsement and History, supra note 26, at 51–57. 
108 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010). 
109 My own normative position is two-fold. First, the “reasonable observer” should be 
considered a reasonably informed member of the community that is likely to be viewing the 
challenged display (or, as here, to become aware of the challenged government act). And 
second, where a government’s actions create the misimpression that it is endorsing religion, it 
has an affirmative obligation to explain its plausible secular reasons to the immediate audience.  
See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 63 (discussing this position).   
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years—the very same time period in which Buono was before the 
Supreme Court—two have been competing to be the official WWI 
National Memorial. If the Mojave Cross does not enjoy a singular 
position, but instead is only one of numerous WWI tributes that are 
given special recognition by the federal government, then the charge 
of religious favoritism evaporates.  
To start, in 2004, Congress passed a bill recognizing the Liberty 
Memorial Museum in Kansas City, Missouri as “America’s National 
World War I Museum.”110 The Museum is located on the grounds of 
the “Liberty Memorial,” an iconic white tower with clear national 
historical significance.111 The site dedication in 1921 marks “the only 
time in history” that all five “supreme Allied Commanders . . . were 
together in one place.”112 And when the Liberty Memorial was 
completed, “President Calvin Coolidge delivered the dedication 
speech to a crowd of 150,000 people.”113  
Then, in April 2009, the House passed a bill requesting that the 
Liberty Memorial monument be designated as the National World 
War I Memorial. In sharp contrast to the assumptions in the Buono 
case, the bill states: “There is no nationally recognized memorial 
honoring the service of Americans who served in World War I.”114 
Also, earlier in 2009, a competing bill was introduced, requesting that 
a District of Columbia World War I Memorial, which already is 
located on the National Mall, be re-designated as “The National and 
District of Columbia World War I Memorial.”115  
While the 111th Congress did not reach closure on which of these 
two monuments is the most fitting national WWI tribute, in March, 
2011, a compromise bill was introduced, proposing to make both of 
                                                                                                                  
110 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 108–375, § 1031, 118 Stat. 1811, 1820 (2004). Interestingly, while the government noted in 
passing, “America’s National World War I Museum,” Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17, Salazar 
v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), it did so only as one item on a list of National 
Memorials located on private land. 
111 For a brief history and a photo of the Memorial itself, see Jason Roe, Monumental 
Undertaking, The Kansas City Public Library (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.kclibrary.org/ 
?q=blog/month-kansas-city-history/monumental-undertaking. 
112 Mission and History, NAT’L WORLD WAR I MUSEUM AT LIBERTY MEM’L, http://www. 
theworldwar.org/s/110/new/index.aspx?sid=110&gid=1&pgid=1114 (last visited Mar. 31, 
2011). 
113 Id. 
114 World War I Memorial and Centennial Act of 2009, H.R. 1849, 111th Cong. § 2, ¶13 
(2009) (emphasis added). 
115 Frank Buckles World War I Memorial Act, H.R. 482, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing 
that the monument be repaired, and for the addition of a supplemental element or sculpture to 
signify its proposed new national status). Frank Buckles was the last surviving American WWI 
veteran. Until his recent death, Mr. Buckles was involved in this campaign for National 
Memorial designation. Richard Goldstein, Frank Buckles, Last American World War I 
Doughboy Dead at 110, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at B16.   
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them “National Memorials,” and to create a new “World War I 
Centennial Commission” to spearhead Centennial ceremonies. The 
bill also proposes that this Commission would establish a new 
commemorative work on the National Mall, on the site of the existing 
D.C. Memorial, and supplementing it to convey its proposed new 
National Memorial status.116 While one could argue that the Mojave 
Cross currently still stands alone as the only WWI “National 
Memorial,” that stark picture is erased by reading the debates over the 
dueling candidates for that honor.  
From a December 2009 hearing on the competing bills, it appears 
that neither the federal government, nor the public, is generally aware 
of the claim that the Mojave Cross was named by Congress to 
represent all who fought in WWI on behalf of the United States.117 
Also at that proceeding, a National Park Service (NPS) representative 
testified against both new bills because: “There has not been any 
study authorized or conducted to determine which of the various 
World War I Memorials in the United States would be best suited to 
be named as the single or official National World War I 
Memorial.”118 She explained that WWI veterans already are honored 
at the General John J. Pershing Park, “a national World War I 
Memorial on Pennsylvania Avenue,” as well as on the Mall near the 
White House, by the 1st Division and 2nd Division Memorials.119  
The sense conveyed is that the choice of the “official” WWI 
National Memorial is a significant decision with major fiscal and 
symbolic import; in contrast, the 2002 Act designating the Mojave 
Cross a National Memorial passed by unnoticed, just a bit player in 
the long Buono litigation saga.  
                                                                                                                  
116 H.R. 938, 112th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2011). 
117 See also Tony Dokoupil, The War We Forgot—World War I Has No National 
Monument, No Iconic Images, And Only One Soldier Still Alive, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 
2008, at 50 (describing WWI as publicly ignored, compared to other U.S. wars; 
hypothesizing on the “seeming lack of interest,” the article suggests that one reason may 
be the lack of records:  “WWI was the last war fought without modern methods of bearing 
witness”). 
118 Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of the Comm. on Energy and Nat’l Res., 
Concerning S. 2097, to Authorize the Rededication of the D.C. War Mem’l as a Nat’l and D.C. 
World War I Mem’l to Honor the Sacrifices Made by American Veterans of World War I, 111th 
Cong. (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/ocl/2006/S2097_120309.htm (statement 
of Katherine H. Stevenson, Assistant Director, Business Services, National Park Service, U.S. 
Department of the Interior) (emphasis added). 
119 Id.; see also American Expeditionary Forces Memorial, AMERICAN BATTLE 
MONUMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.abmc.gov/memorials/memorials/pe.php (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011) (honoring General Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces); First 
Division Monument, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/whho/historyculture/first-
division-monument.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). These monuments, however, are not on the 
official list of “National Memorials.” See supra note 122. 
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2. The Unusual Transfer of the Cross National Memorial 
A second point that is significant here, but which was not 
discussed in the Buono litigation,120 is Congress’s past practice of 
simultaneously “abolishing” the closely related “National Monument” 
status121 when the government transferred previously designated 
National Monument land to another entity.122 Congress similarly has 
the power to abolish any of the “National Memorials” it has 
designated.123 One reason Congress has abolished monuments in the 
                                                                                                                  
120 Discussion of the land transfer terms in the Buono litigation and commentary focused 
on: (i) whether the remedy was invalid because the government failed to solicit other potential 
purchasers for the parcel; and (ii) whether the National Memorial designation meant the 
government would continue to control the property post-transfer. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee at 26–37, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 05-55852) (arguing that 
the land was transferred “in a manner whose purpose and effect is to keep the cross standing, 
and the cross’s continuing designation as a national memorial . . . reaffirm[ed] the government’s 
continuing endorsement of a sectarian religious symbol”); Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono 
and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 64–66 (2010) 
(“The land transfer demonstrated favoritism toward the cross.”). 
121 “National Monument[s]” are defined as “landmarks, structures, and other objects of 
historic or scientific interest,” which are located on government land, while “National 
Memorial[s]” are defined as “commemorative of a historic person or episode.” Designation of 
National Park System Units, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature.html 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
In reviewing the law and examples of each, however, the two categories appear to be 
indistinguishable for purposes of the issues raised in Salazar v. Buono. The annotations to the 
Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006), which gave the President authority to declare a 
“National Monument,” provides a comprehensive list of all national monuments established by 
the President, all national monuments established by Congress, and all national memorials 
established by Congress. Id. 
The most significant difference appears to be this separation of powers issue. While both 
Congress and the President have the power to declare a “National Monument,” only Congress 
has authority to designate a “National Memorial.” Congress has this power through its 
constitutional authority, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the “Property Clause”); U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the “Necessary and Proper Clause”), while the President relies on the 
Antiquities Act § 431, which grants him authority to declare national monuments and to reserve 
a part of federal land for that purpose. In an interesting historical footnote, presidents often have 
used this power as a means of land preservation, particularly in the West. See Christine A. 
Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
1333 (2002) (discussing this extensive, originally unexpected use of the Antiquities Act); Lin, 
supra note 70, at 709–19 (analyzing use of presidential declarations to preserve open lands in 
Western states against political opposition, especially President Clinton’s unusual designation of 
22 such “monuments”).  
122 See Antiquities Act 1906–2006: About the Antiquities Act, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
http://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/abolished.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) 
(listing eleven “abolished” national monuments).  
123 It is well-established that “Congress itself possesses, and has exercised, power to 
change the status of national monuments.” Transfer of Nat’l Monuments to Nat’l Park Serv. in 
the Dep’t of the Interior, 36 Op. Att’y Gen. 75, 79 (1929) (advising that only Congress has 
authority to transfer national monument from War Dept. to National Park Service); Proposed 
Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185 (1938) (advising that 
the President lacks the authority to abolish national monuments, even if he originally designated 
them). Based on the similarities between national monuments and memorials, Congress’s broad 
powers over the use and disposal of federal property, its exclusive authority to designate 
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past is where the monument is later determined to be “of less than 
national significance.”124 Typically, in those circumstances, Congress 
would pass one bill that both transferred the land from NPS to a state 
or local government, and abolished its existing “National Monument” 
designation.125  
The most relevant example is the “Father Millet Cross National 
Monument,” which also involved a lone cross on a small patch of 
land. A large bronze cross inscribed with Latin words glorifying 
Christ,126 at one-eighth acre, it was once known as “America’s 
Smallest National Monument.” It commemorates a French missionary 
priest who, on Good Friday in 1688, blessed the first wooden cross 
erected on that spot to give thanks for the twelve living survivors, and 
to pray for the eighty-eight soldiers who died of starvation manning 
Old Fort Niagara. It was declared a “National Monument” by 
presidential proclamation in 1925, and a Catholic organization, the 
Knights of Columbus, donated the bronze upgrade in 1926.127 But in 
1949, after determining that this monument was of “questionable 
national significance,” Congress passed a bill authorizing the 
Secretary of the Interior to convey the land and monument to the 
State of New York and abolishing the cross’s “national monument” 
status.128  
Moreover, reviewing the typical terms of transfer reveals 
additional irregularities with the Mojave Cross land transfer, which 
                                                                                                                  
 
National Memorials, and exclusive power to abolish National Monuments, it appears 
unassailable to conclude that Congress also has power to abolish, or otherwise alter the status of, 
National Memorials. 
124 See About the Antiquities Act, supra note 123 (providing information about abolished 
national monuments). 
125 Id. 
126 Specifically, the cross is 18 feet high and 8 feet wide, and bears the inscription “REGN. 
VINC. IMP. CHRS.” These abbreviations stand for, “Regnat, Vinci, Imperat, Christus,” which is 
translated as “Christ reigns, conquers, rules.” Thor Borresen, Father Millet Cross: America’s 
Smallest National Monument, III THE REGIONAL REVIEW, no.1, July 1939, available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/regional_review/vol3-1a.htm. 
127 Id. at 2; see also Bob Janiskee, Pruning the Parks: Father Millet Cross National 
Monument, 1925-1949, Was the Smallest National Monument Ever Established, NAT’L PARKS 
TRAVELER (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2009/09/pruning-parks-
father-millet-cross-national-monument-1925-1949-was-smallest-national-monument-ever-
es4482 (describing the monument and the history behind it).  
128 H.R. 4073, Pub. L. 81–292, 63 Stat. 691 (Sept. 7, 1949) (“The national monument, 
upon conveyance of such property to the State of New York, is abolished.”) The bill further 
stated that the transfer was “without consideration, for public use as a part of the Fort Niagara 
State Park, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary may deem advisable[.]” Id. The 
NPS website, in its narrative, “About the ‘Abolished’ National Monuments,” states that this was 
done due to “questionable national significance and limited federal development,” and that the 
Fr. Millet cross monument is now part of Fort Niagara State Park. About the Antiquities Act, 
supra note 123. 
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are relevant here. First, where these abolished National Monuments 
have consisted of physical structures, rather than unique land features, 
none of these land transfer acts contained a reversionary clause that 
required continuing to maintain the monument.129 What these acts did 
tend to include, however, was a reversionary clause requiring that the 
land be kept open for public use.130 Given Sunrise Rock’s beauty, its 
current location in the Mojave Desert Preserve, and its now-private 
owner, transferring the land to the VFW without an express public 
use requirement is an additional sign of untoward favoritism.  
There are two more missed opportunities that also exacerbate the 
appearance of endorsement of religion from the Cross’s continued 
National Memorial status. Given the long local history of Easter 
services at the Mojave Cross, one would expect a “religious use” 
restriction to appear as a condition of the transfer. And recall the 
National Memorial Act’s requirement that the Secretary of the 
Interior install a replica cross and plaque to identity the site as a 
longstanding historic war memorial. Section IV.B.4. explains why 
federal funding of the cross is unconstitutional. But while pre-
transfer, this requirement could have been used as evidence of a 
secular purpose, now any remaining federal obligation has the 
opposite effect. One would expect the land transfer act to require the 
VFW to acquire and install a replica cross and sign, if it chose to keep 
the original memorial, or to erect a replacement WWI memorial 
within a set time period of its removal.  
In sum, for anyone aware of Congress’ past practices, the fact that 
the Mojave Cross National Memorial status was not abolished in the 
land transfer act, and that the VFW is required to maintain a WWI 
memorial on the site, but is not also required to keep the site open for 
public use, refrain from religious worship use, or even pay for the 
replica and sign that are so essential to conveying a secular, historical 
message to viewers—all combine to suggest government endorsement 
of religion. The closer question is whether this history is too obscure 
to matter. The most recent act abolishing a National Monument was 
                                                                                                                  
129 As mentioned, it appears that these transfers were to other governmental entities; given 
the Mount Soledad case law construing the California Constitution, doing that was not an option 
for the Mojave Cross. See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the display of Mount Soledad, a large cross war memorial, on City property 
violated the California Constitution’s “No Preference Clause”).  
130 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 84-1785 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3708, 3710 
(Verendrye National Monument’s bill provided: “That the Verendrye National Monument, 
North Dakota, is hereby abolished, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to convey the 
lands . . . to the State of North Dakota for public recreation use and as a State historic site,” and 
“the title and right to possession . . . shall revert to the United States upon a finding . . . that the 
grantee has not complied with the terms of the conveyance . . . .”).  
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in 1980, but information about these acts is fairly easy to obtain 
online.131 The Mojave Cross’s unusual transfer terms, however, would 
be known to anyone who has closely followed the Buono litigation or 
read the judicial opinions. 
3. Unqualified as a National Historic Landmark 
After the controversy surfaced, in 1999, a NPS historian was asked 
to evaluate the Mojave Cross for a far more common honor, 
placement on the “National Register of Historic Places.”132 He found 
it unqualified. Given that government literature calls the National 
Register “the official list of the Nation’s historic places worthy of 
preservation,”133 this also suggests that the cross was made a National 
Memorial more because it is a Christian symbol with strong 
constituent support, than based on its historical importance and 
national significance.  
But upon investigation, the grounds for this rejection do not 
necessarily undermine the validity of its National Memorial 
designation. To qualify as a National Historic Landmark, 
knowledgeable professionals must find that the property possesses 
both “exceptional value” in showing the Nation’s heritage, and 
“integrity,” a term that refers to consistency with its original 
appearance.134 Because the physical object of the cross war memorial 
had been replaced several times, and because its original 
                                                                                                                  
131 NPS lists eleven National Monuments that have been abolished, with the first occurring 
in 1930 and the most recent in 1980, which is approximately two decades prior to when the 
Mojave Cross controversy began. Antiquities Act 1906–2006: Monuments List, NAT’L PARK 
SERV., http://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 
2011). That list, however, is on the federal government’s own website, and the primary web 
page is titled, “About the Antiquities Act,” which is one of the first stops in looking at the 
National Memorial issue. See About the Antiquities Act, supra note 123. 
132 See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV). 
133 See National Register of Historic Places Program: About Us, NAT’L REGISTER OF 
HISTORIC PLACES, http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
134 36 C.F.R. § 65.4(a) (2009) (emphasis added) (NPS regulations set the criteria for 
evaluating and designating property as a “National Historic Landmark.”). Primarily, properties 
are required to be “nationally significant,” as determined through evaluations by “professionals, 
including historians, architectural historians, archeologists and anthropologists familiar with the 
broad range of the nation’s resources and historical themes.” Id. § 65.4. Subsection (a) further 
specifies that such landmarks must “possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or 
interpreting the heritage of the United States in history” or other areas, and “possess a high 
degree of integrity of location, design . . . materials, [and] workmanship . . . .” Id. § 65.4(a); see 
also National Register of Historic Places: Fundamentals, NAT’L REGISTER OF HISTORIC 
PLACES, http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/national_register_fundamentals.htm (last visited Mar. 
31, 2011) (explaining “integrity” as whether the property “still look[s] much the way it did in 
the past”).  
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commemorative plaque was missing, it lacked the necessary 
“integrity” to qualify—even given sufficient historical value.135  
The second reason provided for the 1999 rejection is based on 
federal preservation laws, which have since changed. Most years, 
there has been an Easter service held outdoors on Sunrise Rock, and 
federal land-marking regulations at that time excluded sites that were 
“used for religious purposes.”136 Federal regulations are now quite 
flexible:137 active houses of worship are on the National Registry and 
have even received federal preservation grants.138  
4. Using Government Funds to Purchase a Cross 
 Turning to the 2002 Act’s requirement that the Secretary of the 
Interior use federal funds to “acquire and install” a large wooden 
cross on Sunrise Rock, it presents an unmistakable Establishment 
Clause problem. The Act is salvageable, though, because this 
provision is both severable and unnecessary. Still, demonstrating this 
constitutional flaw is useful in evaluating the Act’s overall “primary 
effect.” 
While many funding restrictions on religious organizations have 
loosened, Supreme Court precedent still requires it to be done as part 
of a broad, religion-neutral program, and still prohibits spending 
government funds for a “religious use.”139 Also, the Court has been 
particularly strict in evaluating Establishment Clause claims involving 
improvements to real property, which appreciates over time.140  
                                                                                                                  
135 Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
136 Id. at 769 (stating that the second reason NPS denied landmark status to the Mojave 
Cross is that “the site [was] used for religious purposes as well as commemoration”). 
137 See 36 C.F.R. § 65.4(b) (2009) (“Ordinarily . . . properties . . . used for religious 
purposes . . . are not eligible for designation. Such properties, however, will qualify if they fall 
within the following categories: (1) A religious property deriving its primary national 
significance from architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance. . . .”). For a 
discussion of increased tolerance for public funding of the preservation of religious properties, 
see infra Part V.B.4. 
138 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Park Serv., Old North Foundation Awarded $317,000 
Grant Under Save America’s Treasures Program, (May 27, 2003), http://home.nps.gov/news/ 
release.htm?id=395. 
139 The governing case is Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a public 
program of lending computers and other instructional equipment to a broad range of schools, 
including parochial schools), where Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurrence approved this 
divertible form of aid, based on the program’s “secular use” requirement, but maintained that it 
is still unconstitutional to divert public aid to a religious use. Id. at 838–41 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
140 In the principle case, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court allowed 
federal construction grants to church-affiliated universities as part of a broad-based secular 
program, but held that a 20-year restriction on religious use of the publicly financed buildings 
was inadequate because at that time, the building would retain full value. See also Comm. for 
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down a program of 
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The 2002 Act presents an atypical case: the VFW is a secular 
entity, and the only religious “use” of its war memorial is the 
religious service held there one morning a year. But any use of tax 
funds to purchase and erect a large Christian cross raises a bright red 
flag. That holds true even if Congress required the replica solely to 
mitigate the Mojave Cross’s religious appearance by emphasizing the 
war memorial’s historicity. The Sixth Circuit made this point 
recently, while stretching to allow churches to participate in a 
downtown beautification program. It distinguished permissible 
repairs, those exterior portions of churches that “lack any content at 
all,” from the unconstitutional use of public funds to purchase or 
improve anything that “itself has an inherently religious content”—
such as paying for a cross.141  
Indeed, the National Memorial Act’s $10,000 grant does not 
comply with even the current, permissive historic-preservation policy. 
That policy is based on a 2003 legal opinion from the Department of 
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,142 which itself relied on features of 
the “Save America’s Treasures” Program that were absent in the 
                                                                                                                  
 
grants for maintenance and repair of parochial schools). The Court has never repudiated either 
this aspect of Nyquist or its decision in Tilton. 
141 Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 292 (6th Cir. 
2009) (“[A] program may have the primary effect of advancing religion if the benefit itself has 
an inherently religious content. Governments may not dole out crosses or Torahs to their 
citizens, even if they give them to all citizens, without running into an Establishment Clause 
problem. Yet no such aid was distributed here. In the first place, the government gave monetary 
grants, not religious symbols, to participating entities. In the second place . . . the vast majority 
of the reimbursed repairs—the renovation of exterior lights, pieces of masonry and brickwork, 
outdoor planters, exterior doors, concrete ramps, entrance ways, overhangs, building trims, 
gutters, fencing, curbs, shrubbery and irrigation systems—lack any content at all, much less a 
religious content. The thrust of the program goes to facade, not to substance, to giving the 
exterior of the buildings a clean, up-to-date appearance.” (first emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of 
Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002) 
(suggesting that the public aid should be allowed to restore the exteriors of historic houses of 
worship, but prohibited for the interiors, which have religious content).  
142 See Authority of the Dep’t of the Interior to Provide Historic Pres. Grants to Historic 
Religious Props. such as the Old North Church, Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/OldNorthChurch.htm [hereinafter 2003 OLC Opinion]. This was an 
about-face from an earlier opinion, Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Pres. Grants to 
Religious Prop., 19 Op. O.L.C. 267 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 OLC Opinion], which found this 
type of grant unconstitutional based on the pervasively sectarian nature of the church recipients 
and Tilton v. Richardson. This is not to say there will not continue to be legal challenges to 
specific cases.  
Moreover, the 2003 OLC Opinion itself seems to have overstepped. It relied on the 
Mitchell plurality, where Justice Thomas, joined by only three members of the Court, opined 
that paying money directly to religious schools for use in religion class would be acceptable, so 
long as the program itself was available to schools on a neutral basis. 2003 OLC Opinion, supra 
note 143, at II.B. For a discussion of its additional constitutional flaws, see Ira C. Lupu & 
Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 22–25 (2006). 
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Mojave Cross designation. Specifically, these historic preservation 
grants are available to a broad array of mostly secular beneficiaries, 
and are awarded pursuant to a formal, neutral application process.143 
Moreover, the grant award process uses both subject matter experts 
and pre-established, relatively objective criteria.144 Also, those grants 
included a 50-year deed restriction requiring owners to preserve the 
historical features, and a 50-year public use requirement.145 In sum, if 
a court did apply the historic preservation analogy here, the funding 
provision of the Mojave Cross National Memorial Act would not 
survive.  
C. The Baseline Establishment Clause Claim 
It is inherently difficult to draw any reliable conclusions as to the 
constitutionality of the Mojave Cross National Memorial designation. 
Not only are outcomes generally unpredictable given the 
Establishment Clause’s context-specific tests, but many facts are still 
in flux. As shown in Section IV.A., however, the Act is unlikely to 
fail the “secular purpose” test.146 The questions posed by the National 
Registry of Historic Places issue, and the federal funding of a replica 
cross also have been accounted for.147 This Section evaluates whether 
labeling this cross as a National Memorial conveys government 
endorsement of Christianity. Extrapolating some reasonable 
assumptions from the status quo, it appears that this particular 
honorary designation would have a fair chance of passing the 
endorsement test.  
                                                                                                                  
143 2003 OLC Opinion, supra note 143, at II.B; see also Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of 
Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 292 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding property tax 
reimbursement grants given to several downtown churches by city development authority for 
renovations to building exteriors for purpose of improving streetscape appearance, stating: “No 
reasonable, reasonably informed observer, moreover, would infer from the churches’ 
participation in this program, alongside and on equal terms with dozens of secular entities, that 
the agency endorsed or approved of the churches’ religious views. The program’s breadth, 
evenhandedness and eminently secular objectives help to break the link between the government 
and religious indoctrination.” (citations omitted)).  
144 2003 OLC Opinion, supra note 143, at II.C (citing FY 2002 Federal Save America’s 
Treasures Grants—Guidelines and Application Instructions, PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON THE ARTS 
& THE HUMANITIES (2002), http://www.pcah.gov/sat/SAT2002.html).  
145 Id. at II.E. 
146 See supra Section IV.A (showing secular purpose in text, and lack of legislative history 
or sponsor’s statements to suggest otherwise). 
147 See supra Section IV.B.3 (Mojave Cross not qualified based on lack of physical 
“integrity” due to replacement of original cross and superseded “religious use” restriction, so 
failure to qualify does not indicate lack of historic value); Section IV.B.4 (concluding that 
public funding of large cross remains unconstitutional, but that the funding portion of the Act is 
severable). 
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The essential factor is that the “reasonable observer” must be 
deemed aware of the other WWI national memorials, their current 
competition for supremacy, and the general ignorance of the Mojave 
Cross designation. This may in fact be reasonable, given WWI’s 
approaching Centennial, and the correspondingly enhanced 
congressional and public interest in its commemoration. And unlike a 
local viewer of the Mojave Cross itself, a plaintiff challenging its 
National Memorial designation presumably would be interested in, 
and knowledgeable about, this backdrop.  
Next, the Mojave Cross currently is missing from Sunrise Rock, 
and the VFW is eager to replace it. It also seems safe to assume that 
the VFW is likely to post a replacement plaque, in order to 
acknowledge their original 1934 installation and war memorial 
purpose. In addition, although the Land Transfer Act does not itself 
contain appropriate restrictions, assume further that the VFW will 
continue the preexisting use patterns. If so, the land will stay open to 
the public, and will be used for religious services only once a year, for 
an Easter sunrise service.  
Weighing against constitutionality is the appearance of bias: 
Congress now has designated as National Memorials not one, but two 
Christian crosses, both in the midst of high-profile, controversial 
Establishment Clause lawsuits. Particularly egregious, in neither 
Buono nor the Mount Soledad litigation was the honorary designation 
necessary to save the longstanding war memorial from destruction or 
removal. Also troublesome is Congress’s failure to abolish the 
Mojave Cross’s superfluous honor once it settled on land transfer as 
the solution. The Court has recognized that government acts taken to 
preserve an historic war memorial will be viewed more favorably by 
the “reasonable observer,” as compared to government acts to create 
new sectarian symbols, especially given today’s vastly different, more 
pluralistic, divisive social culture.148  
Another concern is that the unique circumstances of this type of 
“speech” renders it more difficult to explain to “viewers” of National 
Memorials why a Christian cross was given this honor. Posting an 
explanatory sign at the location of a monument is a relatively simple 
matter. Here, NPS can, and should, include a context-providing 
disclaimer in all government publications (including websites) that 
list National Memorials or feature the Mojave Cross, but not all 
relevant publications will be under its control. At a minimum, the 
federal government should use its existing opportunities to inform the 
                                                                                                                  
148 See supra Section III; Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817, 1820 (2010) (Kennedy, 
J., plurality opinion); id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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public of the cross’s long history as a war memorial, and the fact that 
it is only “a” WWI symbol, and not “the” WWI memorial for the 
entire nation.  
Based on available information, it seems reasonably likely that 
Congress will pass a bill similar to the one recently introduced. Then 
there will be an “official” WWI National Memorial, most likely 
located on the National Mall, near those commemorating the Nation’s 
other major wars. The bill also contemplates additional publicity for 
the multiple existing WWI monuments. For purposes of this extended 
reflection, assume this to be the case. Once the Mojave Cross is one 
among many, and granted less status than several secular alternatives, 
its National Memorial designation, standing alone, is unlikely to 
violate the Establishment Clause. Taking this as the baseline, the next 
Section investigates the final hypothetical. 
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL TEST CASE 
This final section considers the process if other, equally historic 
WWI monuments were rejected as “National Memorials,” focusing 
on two, very credible candidates. First, WWI was the first war in U.S. 
history in which the battlefield graves of Jewish American soldiers 
were marked by a Jewish Star.149 Thus, a Jewish Star WWI Memorial 
would symbolize religious liberty and also recall those haunting 
battlefield cemeteries in Europe. Second, the Kansas City “Liberty 
Memorial” is a secular symbol with a more illustrious, well-
documented WWI-related history than the simple Mojave Cross.  
For these private speakers to claim the right to have their own 
WWI symbols elevated to “National Memorial” status, they would 
need to plead sufficient allegations to show that the Free Speech 
Clause protects this form of “speech.” While initially this seems quite 
impossible, as it turns out, it is merely improbable.  
Under familiar First Amendment doctrine, when a government 
entity creates a speech opportunity and allows private speakers to 
participate, it may create a speech “forum.” If it then rejects a speaker 
who is within the established content limitations, or fails to establish 
                                                                                                                  
149 See Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United States of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 10, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (“During World War I, the 
War Department determined that the graves of Jewish soldiers who had died in battle would be 
marked with the Star of David. Major General Crosby explained in a 1930 address that ‘[m]any 
of our heroic dead lie in Flanders Field, Suresnes, Belleau Wood, and elsewhere. The star of 
David is mingled with the cross in beautiful and everlasting marble. As they lived together, 
fought together, so they lie buried, side by side.’”) (quoting Jewish Soldiers’ Graves To Be 
Marked by a Double Triangle Instead of a Cross, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1918, at 22; 72 CONG. 
REC. 11064 (June 17, 1930)). 
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content limitations, the rejected speaker may claim a Free Speech 
Clause violation.150 Faced with this claim, the federal government 
would be almost certain to assert Summum’s expanded “government 
speech defense”; it would not willingly relinquish sole discretion over 
“National Memorial” designation decisions.  
But although these congressional designations appear to be 
quintessential “government speech,” involving deliberate choices to 
form and express the national identity,151 a review of the facts 
suggests a more random, ad hoc process.152 Admittedly, post-
Summum, there is little chance of a court ultimately recognizing an 
alleged “National Memorial forum,” but some facts are similar to 
those leading the Tenth Circuit to find a “permanent monument 
forum.” A mix of the realistic and the imaginary serves well to 
explore the intersection of the Establishment Clause and the 
expanding government speech doctrine. 
First, the legislative designation process for National Memorials is 
frequently driven by private speakers who are passionate about a 
specific commemorative message, and not by any formal or well-
considered congressional selection process. To take a recent example, 
the “Flying Cross National Memorial” illustrates both private sector 
involvement and the political nature of these laws. The 
“Distinguished Flying Cross” was the first U.S. military aviation 
award, and it was given retroactively to WWI military aviators, who 
were the first to use planes in battle.153 The project originated with 
individuals, and gradually came to involve first local, and then state 
representatives, and eventually the local congressman, who suggested 
seeking National Memorial status.154  
                                                                                                                  
150 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
(discussing the Student Activities Fund at the University of Virginia as a forum); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (discussing a student forum created by the University of 
Missouri). 
151 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995) (discussing how symbols are used in national identity formation).   
152 Compare Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (government “control” of the message is the 
key element for declaring mixed government-private speech to be “government speech”). 
153 See THE DFC NATIONAL MEMORIAL, http://www.dfcnationalmemorial.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011); Distinguished Flying Cross National Memorial Act, H.R. 2788, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (“To designate a Distinguished Flying Cross National Memorial at the March Field Air 
Museum in Riverside, California.”). 
154 See Society History, THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS SOC’Y, http://www.dfcsociety. 
org/history.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
Two other examples include the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial, 
Washington, D.C., and the National AIDS Memorial Grove. The National Law Enforcement 
Officers Memorial was initiated by detective Donald J. Guilfoil, then fifteen national law 
enforcement organizations worked with Congress to pass legislation designating the National 
Memorial; these organizations also were responsible for designing the Memorial, finding the 
site, and raising the funds to build the Memorial. The Dream That Became Reality, NAT’L LAW 
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Second, the research suggests that, at least in some instances, 
Congress exercises little control over the “messages” of its National 
Memorials. Summum did loosen this “government speech” 
requirement to “final approval authority.”155 But while a City Council 
vote to accept a “Ten Commandments” monument reflects some 
legislative knowledge of the new display’s content,156 this does not 
seem to be the case for all of Congress’s National Memorial 
designations. Two relevant examples, the 2002 Mojave Cross 
designation and the 2004 designation of “America’s National World 
War I Museum,” merited just a few lines in voluminous annual 
defense appropriations bills, and neither had any legislative history. 
So there is nothing to indicate that anyone, besides the bills’ sponsors, 
was even aware of voting to bestow these honors.  
Indeed, the sense one gets from reading these accounts is that the 
National Memorial honor relates more to retail politics than to any 
particular criteria, or even to a uniquely high level of national status. 
While certainly many well-known icons are included, this designation 
also has been awarded to obscure monuments with far less, or even no 
national recognition. One of the better examples of this is the 
“National Military Working Dog Teams Monument.”157  
So, there actually is a plausible basis for the private groups who 
sponsor the Liberty Memorial and the hypothetical Jewish Star 
Memorial to allege a Free Speech Clause claim, asserting their right 
to have their monuments similarly designated. The federal 
government likely would fight to retain complete discretion over 
grants of “National Memorial” status, and so would assert the 
“government speech doctrine” as its defense.  
                                                                                                                  
 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEM’L FUND (Apr. 10, 2000), http://www.nleomf.org/newsroom/ 
news-releases/the-dream-that-became-reality.html. Similarly, the National AIDS Memorial 
Grove was conceived in 1988 by a small group of San Francisco residents. Ground restoration 
began in 1991, supported by private funding from the Grove Endowment, and the site was 
designated as a National Memorial in 1996. Learn More About the Grove, NAT’L AIDS MEM’L 
GROVE, http://www.aidsmemorial.org/history (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
155 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
156 See id. at 1133 (quoting IMLA Brief, supra note 31, at 21) (noting that an IMLA survey 
documented municipalities’ editorial control through a variety of factors, including “‘prior 
submission requirements, design input, requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative 
approvals of specific content proposals’”). 
157 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, 
§ 2877, 122 Stat. 3, 563–64 (2008) (“[A] national monument to honor the sacrifice and service 
of United States Armed Forces working dog teams that have participated in the military 
operations of the United States.”); see also NAT’L WAR DOGS MONUMENT, INC., http://www. 
nationalwardogsmonument.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
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In the end, based on the factors outlined in Summum, a court is 
more likely than not to hold that National Memorial designations are 
“government speech,” rather than any type of speech forum. Like 
monuments, these congressional declarations are an inherently 
expressive context.158 And anyone aware of the designation would 
reasonably assume that the federal government is both speaking, and 
conveying its approbation.159 Congress does vote on these proposals, 
and at least the bill’s sponsors intend to convey a message of special 
honor. At a minimum, the 2002 National Memorial Act appears to 
communicate Congress’s agreement that a longstanding Christian 
cross in the desert is an appropriate symbol with which to honor 
American participation in World War I.  
What these alternative speech claims add to the endorsement-
analysis mix, then, is the way in which the “government speech 
defense” puts the government in an indefensible position. It would be 
required to assert affirmatively that adopting the majority religion’s 
preeminent symbol, the Christian cross, is preferable to using the 
secular, or the minority religion, symbol, to commemorate the U.S. 
role in World War I. When the alternatives have equal or superior 
historical value, judged objectively, then the government’s preference 
for the Mojave Cross would unavoidably convey sectarian 
discrimination.  
This hypothetical also shows how rejected speakers can provide a 
kind of functional limit for sifting through government speech 
claims.160 While there are no general selection “criteria” for National 
Memorial decisions,161 each specific designation act states Congress’s 
commemorative purpose for the honor granted. Once there is an 
expressly stated purpose (e.g., commemorate WWI), then whether a 
particular government expression is primarily religious or secular can 
be tested by Congress’s compliance with its own stated statutory 
purpose. When the only meaningful difference between proposals is 
their religious content (or lack thereof), then a rejection will tend to 
prove that the honorary status is based on religion. In that situation, 
                                                                                                                  
158 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (“A monument, by definition, is a structure that is 
designed as a means of expression.”). 
159 See id. (“When a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it 
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the 
structure.”). 
160 See supra at Section I (discussing references to role of criteria in government speech 
cases in Summum opinions of the Court (Justice Alito) and Justice Breyer). 
161 The only general criteria located for National Memorial is quite expansive and 
amorphous:  they commemorate “a historic person or episode.” Designation of National Park 
System Units, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011). 
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the government would be left with nothing more than the nakedly 
unconstitutional claim that the Christian symbol better represents the 
national identity—or (and perhaps even worse) that it is more 
consistent with the image the government administration seeks to 
present to the world.162  
This is the point at which Justice Souter’s apocryphal prediction 
reenters the stage. 163 Because the Establishment Clause remains the 
one clearly acknowledged limit on the new broad “government 
speech doctrine,” governments will try to explain their choices in 
secular terms. But in the hard test case, where the stated historical 
rationale rings false in light of rejected speakers, a government’s 
effective choice is plausibly explained only by a religious preference.  
To escape this dilemma, at some point, there will be some 
government actor who will end up claiming that the “government 
speech doctrine” frees government from Establishment Clause 
restrictions on religious viewpoint discrimination. While most courts 
would hold that claim unconstitutional, some will be attracted to 
claims that are allegedly predicated on community or national 
ideyntity, but actually are indistinguishable from assertions of 
national or local religious identity. As illustrated by the hypotheticals 
explored in this Article, there is a thin, but recognizable, dividing line. 
When the new government speech defense is used to justify religious-
historical speech, remembering Justice Souter’s warning may provide 
a useful caution. 
                                                                                                                  
162 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (“The City has selected those monuments that it wants 
to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who 
frequent the Park. . . . The City’s actions . . . unmistakably signify[] to all Park visitors that the 
City intends the monument to speak on its behalf.”). 
163 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussed supra Part II). 
